Apparent authority is the power of an agent to act on behalf of a principal, even though not expressly or impliedly granted. This power arises only if a third party reasonably infers, from the principal's conduct, that the princip
Are weapons parts kits or incomplete frames or receivers regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968?
This case asks the Court to determine whether the Gun Control Act of 1968’s definition of “firearm” permits the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) to regulate weapons parts kits and incomplete frames and receivers. Merrick Garland, Attorney General, et al., argues that a natural reading of the word “firearm” includes weapon parts kits, incomplete frames, and receivers; and, that failing to regulate these items would create a loophole in the nation’s gun laws. Jennifer VanDerStok et al., counters that the rule is outside the scope of the ATF’s authority. This case touches on important questions regarding the Gun Control Act of 1968, and its ability to regulate ghost guns.
(1) Whether “a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive” under 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 is a “firearm” regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968; and (2) whether “a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver” that is “designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver” under 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c) is a “frame or receiver” regulated by the act.
The definition of “firearm” in the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) includes “any weapon… which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” as well as “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” VanDerStok v.
Is the EPA required to consider costs when determining whether it is appropriate and necessary to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities?
The United States Supreme Court will consider whether the EPA acted reasonably based on the agency’s interpretation of its obligations under the Clean Air Act when it did not consider the costs, during rulemaking, of regulating the emissions of hazardous air pollutants from oil- and coal-fired electric utilities. The Petitioners argue that because the EPA did not consider cost of compliance as a factor in its decision, the EPA’s rule is an incorrect interpretation of the Clean Air Act and is unreasonable. The Respondents counter that the EPA acted reasonably and correctly interpreted the Clean Air Act by not considering cost of compliance as a factor in its decision to regulate hazardous air pollutants from electric utility plants. The Court’s decision will implicate the regulation of hazardous air pollutant emissions from electric utilities, and may have broader implications for the statutory interpretation of similar regulatory mandates to agencies.
The Clean Air Act treats electric utilities differently from other sources of hazardous air pollutants. Other sources are required to limit their emissions if they exceed quantitative thresholds. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) & (d)(1). By contrast, before EPA regulates hazardous air pollutants from electric utilities, it must first conduct a study of the hazards to public health resulting from those emissions even after imposition of all the other requirements of the Clean Air Act, and then decide whether it is "appropriate and necessary" to regulate such residual emissions under § 7412 after considering the results of the study. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
The question for the Court is:
Whether EPA's interpretation of "appropriate" in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) is unreasonable because it refused to consider a key factor (costs) when determining whether it is appropriate to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities.
THE SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING: Whether the Environmental Protection Agency unreasonably refused to consider costs in determining whether it is appropriate to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities.
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1970, including what is now § 7412, to address issue of air pollution, focusing on reducing hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”). See White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v.
Under the Hobbs Act, can someone who wasn’t directly involved in a case challenge a government agency’s decision in court if they believe the agency went beyond its legal power? Second, do the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to temporarily store nuclear fuel away from nuclear-reactor sites?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether parties like Texas can challenge an agency’s decision in court, despite not participating in the agency’s earlier hearing concerning the decision. Texas claims it has standing as an aggrieved party because it only needs to participate even slightly in the original decision-making process, while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) argues Texas misinterprets the law because Texas was required to be a party in the decision-making process, not just a general participant, to be an aggrieved party. The case also asks the Supreme Court to decide if federal laws regulating nuclear energy production allow the NRC to license private companies to store nuclear waste away from the nuclear energy facilities, specifically in the Permian Basin in Texas. Texas argues that federal statutes only empower the NRC to license on-site or federal controlled off-site storage, while the NRC asserts that they have that power because the statutes do not explicitly limit its authority to license temporary, private off-site storage. The outcome of this case has future implications for both nuclear energy expansion, and oil and gas production in the Permian Basin region.
Whether the Hobbs Act, which authorizes a “party aggrieved” by an agency’s “final order” to petition for review in a court of appeals, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency’s statutory authority.
Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
In 1942, the first nuclear reactor was created in the United States. Texas v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 3. In 1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, which allowed civilian use of atomic power.
Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine, most commonly used in [wex:tort], that holds an employer or principal legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent, if such acts occur within the scope of the employment or agency. Typically when respondeat superior is invoked, a plaintiff will look to hold both the employer and the employee liable.
Since 1983, hospitals have received reimbursement for treating Medicare patients with the option of receiving additional compensation for treating low-income individuals. It was recently discovered that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) miscalculated rates in the 1990s, causing certain hospitals to receive less than they were entitled to receive. Several hospitals challenged these underpayments under 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(a)(3), arguing that the 180-day deadline for challenging payments should be "equitably tolled," or extended for reasons of fairness. Although the agency that receives these challenges, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB), concluded that the decision to extend the filing deadline was beyond its authority, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that this deadline may be extended due to a presumption for equitable tolling. Here, Petitioner Sebelius of the Department of Health and Human Services contends that Congress intended to give her the authority to decide when to toll a statute and that this is not one of those cases. In contrast, Respondents Auburn Regional Medical Center, et al., argue that a court may extend this filing deadline. If hospitals are able to challenge underpayments beyond the 180-day deadline, the caseload of PRRB may drastically increase and so slow the process of compensating hospitals. However, allowing this extension may ensure that hospitals are properly compensated.
