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BAPCPA

Synonyms
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act

Clark v. Rameker

Issues

Is an inherited individual retirement account a “retirement fund” under the Bankruptcy Code, and thus exempted from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate?

In October 2010, Heidi Heffron-Clark and Brandon Clark filed a voluntary joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed an inherited IRA under the retirement funds exemption of Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy trustee and creditors objected to the claimed exemption. The district court concluded that inherited IRAs are exempted because they do not lose their character as retirement funds once they are passed onto the beneficiary. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, stating that an inherited IRA does not qualify for a retirement fund exemption because it was not set aside for the debtor’s retirement. The United States Supreme Court must decide if an inherited IRA constitutes a “retirement fund” under Section 522. This case implicates debtors’ and creditors’ access to inherited IRAs once a debtor files for bankruptcy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an individual retirement account that a debtor has inherited is exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate under Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 522, which exempts "retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation" under certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

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Facts

Ruth Heffron established an Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”) and designated her daughter, Petitioner Heidi Heffron-Clark, as the sole beneficiary. See In re Clark, 714 F.3d 559, 560. When Ruth died in September 2001, the account, worth approximately $300,000, passed to Heidi.

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Hamilton v. Lanning

Issues

Whether the bankruptcy court may consider changes in the debtor’s income and expenses after the pre-filing period in order to determine the amount the debtor must pay to creditors.

 

This case concerns the extent of a bankruptcy court's flexibility in determining the "projected disposable income" of a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). Stephanie Kay Lanning filed for bankruptcy in October 2006 and proposed monthly payments of $144, based on her current income and expenses. Jan Hamilton, Lanning's bankruptcy trustee, objected and said that Lanning's "projected disposable income" was actually over $1,000 per month. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas overruled the objection and approved Lanning's plan. The court found that, while Hamilton's calculation of "projected disposable income" based on Lanning's income from the prior six months was correct under Form 22C, the results were inequitable because Lanning's income was artificially inflated for two months because of a buyout from her prior employer. The Bankruptcy Appeals Panel and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals both affirmed. Hamilton argues that the plain language of the statute mandates his “mechanical” approach, while Lanning argues that her "forward-looking" approach avoids absurd results. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will provide clarity to a statutory term that has flummoxed the lower courts, while simultaneously affecting the flexibility of bankruptcy judges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in calculating the debtor’s “projected disposable income” during the plan period, the bankruptcy court may consider evidence suggesting that the debtor’s income or expenses during that period are likely to be different from her income or expenses during the pre-filing period?

In October 2006, Stephanie Kay Lanning ("Lanning") filed for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code. See In re Lanning, 545 F.3d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir.

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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts

Issues

Does the court have discretion to deny a debtor’s motion to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing to another chapter if the debtor meets the technical requirements for the other chapter?

 

Robert Marrama sought to convert his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to a Chapter 13 after meeting the requirements for Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court denied Marrama’s motion to convert based on Marrama’s prior bad faith conduct in failing to report in his bankruptcy schedules the value of a tax refund and vacation home. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether courts have discretion to deny conversions based on an evaluation of the debtor’s conduct. The decision will hinge on the statutory language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. While this issue may be limited to filings that occurred before Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, it will give the court the opportunity to clarify the scope of the good faith requirement in bankruptcy proceedings and the amount of discretion afforded to bankruptcy judges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the right to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to another chapter can be denied notwithstanding the plain language of the statute and the legislative history.

Robert Marrama entered the flooring business as a teenager and grew his family’s small enterprise into a multi-million dollar company. Sonia Nezamzadeh, Medill—On the Docket: Marrama, Robert v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, et al., posted on June 13, 2006.

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Ransom v. MBNA America Bank, N.A.

Issues

Whether an above-median debtor may claim a vehicle ownership cost deduction for vehicles the debtor owns outright.

 

This case reflects a lack of certainty in the bankruptcy code regarding the proper treatment of the vehicle ownership deduction when calculating an above-median Chapter 13 debtor’s disposable income. Courts are split on whether the deduction can be taken where the debtor owns a vehicle in full and is not responsible for monthly payments on the vehicle. Jason Ransom filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and claimed a vehicle ownership deduction based on his ownership of an automobile that he owned free and clear. The Ninth Circuit found that the vehicle ownership deduction was not permitted if there was no existing obligation on the vehicle. Ransom argues that the court misinterpreted the statute and failed to recognize that a plain reading of the statute supports the deduction. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the availability of the vehicle ownership deduction to Chapter 13 debtors who own their vehicles outright.​

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in calculating the debtor's "projected disposable income" during the plan period, the bankruptcy court may allow an ownership cost deduction for vehicles only if the debtor is actually making payments on the vehicles.

Jason Ransom ("Ransom") is a single man living in Nevada. See Ransom v. MBNA, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Bankruptcy Case Blog, Tracy Keeton: A Fork in the Road: Courts Split on Transportation Ownership Deductions (Apr. 6, 2010)

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