Apparent authority is the power of an agent to act on behalf of a principal, even though not expressly or impliedly granted. This power arises only if a third party reasonably infers, from the principal's conduct, that the princip
As part of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") adopted a mandate requiring that employment-based health plans covered by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") include twenty contraceptive methods. Two corporations, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, sued, objecting on religious grounds to the inclusion of four of the methods because they prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg. The corporations argue that the Mandate offends their religious rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and the Free Exercise Clause. The government argues that corporations do not have these rights; and, in any case, the Mandate is statutorily and constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court will consider whether for-profit corporations can sue under RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause, and whether this mandate violates corporations’ right to exercise religion. The Court’s ruling may significantly impact foundational principles of corporate law and the scope of corporations’ First Amendment rights. This case will also impact the Affordable Care Act’s power to mandate health plans.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., provides that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(a) and (b). The question presented is whether RFRA allows a for-profit corporation to deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives to which the employees are otherwise entitled by federal law, based on the religious objections of the corporation's owners.
Whether the religious owners of a family business, or their closely-held business corporation, have free exercise rights that are violated by the application of the contraceptive-coverage Mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”).
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), employment-based health care plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) are required to provide coverage for certain preventative health services. SeeHobby
The business judgment rule provides a director of a corporation immunity from liability when a plaintiff sues on grounds that the director violated the duty of care to the corporation so long as the director’s actions fall within the parameters of th
A close corporation is a corporation which is held by a limited number of shareholders and is not publicly traded.
Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, do the anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers apply to an individual who reports a securities law violation internally but who has not reported it to the Securities and Exchange Commission?
This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether the anti-retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) provides protection for individuals who report fraud or corporate misconduct internally and not to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Although the statutory definition of “whistleblower,” as well as previous SEC interpretation of the statute, indicate that an individual must report misconduct to the SEC to reap the benefits of the anti-retaliation provision, the SEC has recently changed its interpretation. Under its new interpretation, the SEC has found that even those who only report to internal senior management have a right to these protections. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (“DRT”) argues that the SEC’s interpretation is at odds with the clear meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions and was not issued in a procedurally valid manner. Paul Somers, a former employee of DRT, counters that the term “whistleblower” in the Dodd-Frank Act is ambiguous and that the SEC’s interpretation is reasonable and valid. With this decision, the Supreme Court will determine the statutory rights of securities violation whistleblowers and what procedures whistleblowers must use when reporting in order to invoke the anti-retaliation protections prescribed by the Dodd-Frank Act.
Whether the anti-retaliation provision for “whistle-blowers” in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act extends to individuals who have not reported a violation of the securities laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission and thus fall out-side the Act’s definition of a “whistleblower.”
Petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (“DRT”) is a corporation that employed Respondent Paul Somers (“Somers”) as Vice President of Portfolio Management from 2010 until they fired him in April 2014. See Brief for Petitioner, Digital Realty Trust, Inc., at 9.
Whether a corporation, like an individual, has “personal privacy” that could be violated by disclosure of facts obtained during a law enforcement investigation.
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) generally allows access to, and disclosure of, federal information and records to those who requested them, subject to some exceptions, including one for a disclosure that would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy.” Following a recent investigation of Respondent AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) by Petitioner the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), Respondent CompTel, a non-profit trade association, requested under FOIA all of the records and information pertaining to the FCC’s investigation. In allowing disclosure of some of the information, the FCC rejected AT&T’s argument that such disclosure would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy,” holding that this exception was strictly limited to individuals. AT&T appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that a corporation may have “personal privacy” interests and remanded to the FCC. AT&T argues that the term “personal privacy” applies to corporations as well as individuals, and the FCC argues that such a term is limited to individuals. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the amount of protection given to corporations under FOIA and will likely affect the amount of access the public has to certain private corporate information.
Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), exempts from mandatory disclosure records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes when such disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of "personal privacy." The question presented is: Whether Exemption 7(C)'s protection for "personal privacy" protects the "privacy" of corporate entities.
Under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, federal agencies must disclose records to anyone who requests them, subject to certain exemptions. See AT&T v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 492 (3d Cir.
The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.
· Time, Adam Cohen: Why Companies Don’t Deserve Personal Privacy Rights (Dec. 15, 2010)
· Inside Counsel, Melissa Maleske: Supreme Court Will Decide if "Personal Privacy" under FOIA Applies to Corporations (Nov. 30, 2010)
· United States Department Of Justice: FOIA Request Handbook
When someone has a fiduciary duty to someone else, the person with the duty must act in a way that will benefit someone else financially.
Can foreign plaintiffs sue corporations in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute?
Under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), foreign victims of torts that violate international law may sue foreign perpetrators in United States courts if the case touches and concerns the United States. The Court must now determine whether the ATS contemplates suits against foreign corporations. Jesner et al.––survivors of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and the families of such victims––allege that Arab Bank (“the Bank”), headquartered in Jordan, financed terrorist organizations through its New York branch, and should therefore be within the purview of the ATS. The Bank denies these allegations, and maintains that, because corporate liability is not a universal international norm, United States courts do not have jurisdiction over foreign corporations under the ATS. Jesner argues that denying corporate liability will eliminate a significant deterrent against terrorism financing and create international discord, while the Bank counters that corporate liability would actually hinder counterterrorism efforts and damage the United States’ alliance with Jordan.
Whether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, categorically forecloses corporate liability.
Petitioners, Joseph Jesner, et al. (“Jesner”), are non-residents of the United States who were injured by terrorists in the Middle East. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2015 ). Respondent, Arab Bank, PLC (the “Bank”), is a global bank headquartered in Jordan, with a branch in New York.
Oral argument: Feb. 28, 2012
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Sep. 17, 2010)
