Apparent authority is the power of an agent to act on behalf of a principal, even though not expressly or impliedly granted. This power arises only if a third party reasonably infers, from the principal's conduct, that the princip
Must a plan fiduciary establish that services were necessary and paid for at a reasonable cost as an affirmative defense to a 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) prohibited transaction claim, or must a plaintiff plead and prove that services were unnecessary or unreasonably costly as an element of their prohibited transaction claim?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an employee can state a claim that their employer violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) by alleging that the employer had third parties such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers provide services for their employee retirement plan. If yes, the burden of proof lies on employer defendants to establish that such services were necessary for the operation of the plan and paid for at reasonable cost if they wish to avoid liability. If no, a plaintiff alleging only that a prohibited transaction was entered into cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Casey Cunningham and other Cornell University Employees (“Cunningham”) stress that § 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA prohibits all transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and parties in interest such as service providers, regardless of whether other sections of ERISA create exemptions, so a plaintiff should not have to plead anything more than that such a prohibited transaction took place — at least to state a claim and survive a motion to dismiss. Cornell counters that common sense and other sections of ERISA — one of which § 1106(a) itself refers to — show that ERISA cannot mean even to presumptively prohibit transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and service providers such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers. The outcome of this case will resolve a split between the Courts of Appeals and determine how easily employee beneficiaries of retirement plans will be able to sue their employers for suspected mismanagement of those plans.
Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision’s text.
Editor’s Note: The staff of the Legal Information Institute, including the students who wrote and edited this Preview, are employees of Cornell University.
When someone has a fiduciary duty to someone else, the person with the duty must act in a way that will benefit someone else financially.
Did the Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii cloud the State of Hawaii's title to land ceded to it by the federal government, opening these lands up to ownership challenges by Native Hawaiians and preventing the state from selling or otherwise transfer the land?
In 1993, Congress and the President adopted a resolution ("Apology Resolution"), in which the United States apologized for its role in the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893. Shortly thereafter, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA") sought to enjoin a residential development on the Leiali'i land parcel, land owned by the state, but held in trust for Native Hawaiians and the general public. OHA also requested that the state agency in charge of the parcel's development certify that any transfer of the parcel's ownership would not diminish Native Hawaiians' claims to the land. The state agency refused and sent OHA a check for the land, which OHA refused. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the Apology Resolution had changed the legal relationships of the parties involved, and enjoined further development of the land until the state of Hawaii reconciled with Native Hawaiians. In this case, the Supreme Court must determine whether the Apology Resolution changes the legal duties and obligations of the parties involved, or whether it is simply a statement of regret. This case will have far-reaching implications for land in other states which may have competing claims of ownership by native populations.
In the Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Congress acknowledged and apologized for the United States' role in that overthrow. The question here is whether this symbolic resolution strips Hawaii of its sovereign authority to sell, exchange, or transfer 1.2 million acres of state land-29 percent of the total land area of the State and almost all the land owned by the State-unless and until it reaches a political settlement with native Hawaiians about the status of that land.
In 1893, the Republic of Hawaii became a territory of the United States, and ceded 1.8 million acres of land to the federal government. See Office of Haw. Affairs v. Housing and Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 177 P.3d 884, 891 (Haw.
