freedom of religion

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius

Issues

  1. Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act protect for-profit corporations?
  2. Does the contraceptive-coverage Mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 violate corporations’ religious exercise rights?

 

As part of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") adopted a mandate requiring that employment-based health plans covered by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") include twenty contraceptive methods. Two corporations, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, sued, objecting on religious grounds to the inclusion of four of the methods because they prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg. The corporations argue that the Mandate offends their religious rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and the Free Exercise Clause. The government argues that corporations do not have these rights; and, in any case, the Mandate is statutorily and constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court will consider whether for-profit corporations can sue under RFRA or the Free Exercise  Clause,  and whether this mandate violates corporations’ right to exercise religion. The Court’s ruling may significantly impact foundational principles of corporate law and the scope of corporations’ First Amendment rights. This case will also impact the Affordable Care Act’s power to mandate health plans.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., provides that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(a) and (b). The question presented is whether RFRA allows a for-profit corporation to deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives to which the employees are otherwise entitled by federal law, based on the religious objections of the corporation's owners.

 

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius

Whether the religious owners of a family business, or their closely-held business corporation, have free exercise rights that are violated by the application of the contraceptive-coverage Mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”).

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), employment-based health care plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) are required to provide coverage for certain preventative health services. SeeHobby

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Establishment Clause

The First Amendment's Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” This clause not only forbids the government from establishing an official religion, but also prohibits government actions that unduly favor one religion over another.

Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru

Issues

Under the First Amendment’s religion clauses, can civil courts adjudicate an employee’s employment-discrimination claim against her religious employer where the employee’s job entailed important religious functions?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether two teachers at two Catholic schools are “ministers” and thus fall within the First Amendment’s “ministerial exception.” This exception immunizes religious employers from generally applicable employment-discrimination laws, so long as the employees at issue are considered “ministers.” Petitioners, Our Lady of Guadalupe School and St. James Catholic School (“the Schools”), contend that that under Hosanna-Tabor, an employee’s “job function” is the primary factor that courts should consider when determining whether an employee of a religious organization qualifies as a “minister.” The Schools contend that both teachers at issue here engaged in important religious functions by teaching religion to students. Respondents and teachers, Agnes Morrissey-Berru and Kristen Biel (“Morrissey-Berru”), counter that Hosanna-Tabor established a four-factor test, looking not only to the employee’s religious functions, but also to her title, training, and actions. According to Morrissey-Berru, neither teacher held a ministerial title, received religious training, nor held themselves out to be ministers. Even looking to their religious functions, she contends that teaching religion among other secular subjects is insufficient to make a teacher a minister. The outcome of this case will have implications for religious organizations’ employment practices and the civil-rights protections of their employees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the First Amendment’s religion clauses prevent civil courts from adjudicating employment-discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer, when the employee carried out important religious functions.

This case consolidates two cases, the first brought by Kristen Biel and the second brought by Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru. Orders and Proceedings, 19-267.

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Town of Greece v. Galloway

Issues

Does a town violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by starting its board meetings with prayer?

In 1999, the Town of Greece, New York (“the Town”), began starting its Town Board meetings with a moment of prayer. The Town developed an informal practice of inviting clergy to give the opening prayer, and those clergy who accepted were given the “Chaplain of the Month” award. In 2008, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens started complaining about the practice because they felt it aligned the town with Christianity. Over the next year, the Town invited four non-Christian prayer-givers, but in January 2009, all prayer-givers were again Christian. Galloway and Stephens sued in the Western District of New York, claiming that the practice violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that a reasonable person could believe that the practice affiliated the Town with Christianity. The Town petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted to determine the constitutionality of legislative prayer practices. This case will address the boundaries of the freedom of religion and the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court’s decision could effectively end long-standing governmental practices that contain religious connotations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), this Court upheld the practice of starting legislative sessions with an invocation, based on an "unambiguous and unbroken history” of legislative prayer dating back to the First Congress. Id. At 792. The prayers in Marsh were offered for sixteen years by the same paid Presbyterian minister and frequently contained explicitly Christian themes. See id. at 785, 793 n.14. Nonetheless, this Court held that such prayers are "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country," and constitutional unless the selection of prayer-givers "stem[s] from an impermissible motive" or "the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief." Id. at 792, 793, 794-95. The Court declined to apply the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

In this case, the court of appeals held that the Town of Greece violated the Establishment Clause by allowing volunteer private citizens to open town board meetings with a prayer. Though the Town had never regulated the content of the prayers, had permitted any citizen from any religious tradition to volunteer to be a prayer-giver, and did not discriminate in selecting prayer-givers, the court struck down the Town's prayer practice, applying an "en-dorsement" test derived from Lemon. See App. 17a. The question presented is:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a legislative prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause notwithstanding the absence of discrimination in the selection of prayer-givers or forbidden exploitation of the prayer opportunity.

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Facts

Greece, New York (“the Town”) is a town of nearly 94,000 residents, located just outside the city of Rochester, in Monroe County. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 (2nd Cir. 2012).

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