statutory construction

Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton

Issues

Does the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974’s “church plan” exemption apply to a pension plan maintained by an otherwise-qualifying church-affiliated organization, regardless of whether a church initially established the plan?

This consolidated case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve a conflict over the application of the “church plan” exemption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The parties disagree over whether the exemption applies to a pension plan maintained by a church-affiliated entity but not established by a church. Petitioners Advocate Health Care Network et al. (“Advocate”) argue that historical evidence and the statutory text establish that the exemption covers pension plans created by church agencies in addition to plans created by churches themselves. Advocate contends that a contrary interpretation would invite impermissible government interference with and discrimination between religious denominations. Maria Stapleton and fellow Respondents (“Stapleton”) contend that the language and purpose of the “church plan” exemption illustrate that it was not meant to cover a pension plan that was not created by a church. Stapleton also asserts that exempting the pension plans of church-affiliated entities from ERISA violates the Establishment Clause and puts thousands of church-agency employees at risk of losing their retirement benefits. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) governs employers that offer pensions and other benefits to their employees. “Church plans” are exempt from ERISA’s coverage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(33), 1003(b)(2). For over thirty years, the three federal agencies that administer and enforce ERISA—the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation—have interpreted the church plan exemption to include pension plans maintained by otherwise qualifying organizations that are associated with or controlled by a church, whether or not a church itself established the plan.

The question presented is whether ERISA’s church plan exemption applies so long as a pension plan is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan.

This case is a combination of appeals from United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Third Circuits. The facts from each case are substantially similar. 

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Bond v. United States

Issues

Do the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, read in connection with the treaty power, allow a statute that was enacted by Congress to enforce a treaty to serve as a valid basis for prosecuting a criminal defendant in Federal District Court?

Petitioner Carol Anne Bond was arrested in 2007 for attempts to poison a romantic rival, which culminated in a minor burn to the rival’s thumb. A federal district court sentenced Bond to six years in prison and five years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a fine and make restitution, under the authority of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. Congress passed that statute to implement an international arms-control agreement to prohibit chemical warfare. Bond challenged her conviction, claiming the statute’s application to her domestic conduct exceeded Congress’ limited and enumerated powers. In reviewing her challenge, the Third Circuit held that Congress’ power to implement treaties validated the statute and Bond’s conviction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will affect not only how broadly federal criminal statutes apply, but also the scope of Congress’ authority to implement treaties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations; and
  2. whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

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Facts

In 2006, Carol Anne Bond discovered that her friend, Myrlinda Haynes, was pregnant from an affair with Bond’s husband. See United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir.

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CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood

Issues

Does the plain language of the CROA create a non-waivable right to sue, thereby  voiding  a consumer contract’s binding arbitration agreement?

 

Respondents Wanda Greenwood, Ladelle Hatfield, and Deborah McCleese each applied for an Aspire Visa credit card that petitioner CompuCredit Corporation marketed. Petitioner Synovus Bank issued the Aspire Visas after each respondent signed an agreement containing a binding arbitration provision. When respondents were charged card-related fees, they filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated alleging that petitioners engaged in deceitful marketing in violation of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq. (“CROA”). CompuCredit moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The district court acknowledged the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, but held that the CROA created a non-waivable right for consumers to sue in court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under the CROA. Petitioners argue that the contract between the parties should be honored and the binding arbitration clause enforced. Respondents contend, however, that Congress intended to preserve the right to bring a claim in court when it enacted the CROA. The Supreme Court’s decision will consider the balance between consumers’ right to contract and providing adequate protections for vulnerable consumers. This decision will affect the enforceability of consumer contracts’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the extent to which arbitration may act as an acceptable substitute for an individual’s access to court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether claims arising under the CROA are subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.

CompuCredit Corporation considered a credit repair organization for purposes of this case, marketed a subprime credit card called Aspire Visa to consumers with impaired credit records. See Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). As the card’s exclusive marketer and advertiser, CompuCredit Corp.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Duguid v. Facebook, Inc.

Issues

Does the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 prohibit the use of a system that stores phone numbers and dials them automatically?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the definition of an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) as set forth under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”). The statute defines an ATDS as equipment that “has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Employing a grammatical analysis, Respondent Facebook contends that a system is an ATDS only when it can automatically call phone numbers that were produced or stored using a random number generator. Also using a grammatical analysis, Petitioner Noah Duguid counters that an ATDS encompasses a system that can store and automatically call phone numbers, irrespective of whether the system uses a random number generator. The outcome of this case has significant implications in determining the type of devices and systems that could qualify as an ATDS and what callers could be subject to the $1,500-per-call statutory liability under the TCPA. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the definition of an "automatic telephone dialing system" in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 encompasses any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “us[e] a random or sequential number generator.”

Responding to the rise of unsolicited and intrusive robocalls, Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”). Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., (9th Cir.

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Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro

Issues

Are service advisors at car dealerships exempt from the Fair Labor Standard Act’s overtime-pay requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A)?

The issue in this case involves whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime-pay exemption for “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles,” contained in 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), also exempts service advisors. Encino Motorcars argues that the plain language and structure of § 213(b)(10)(A) unambiguously exempt service advisors from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. Navarro argues that the plain language and structure of § 213(b)(10)(A) clearly do not exempt service advisors from the FLSA’s overtime requirements and that Congress’s intent in enacting the exemption and the FLSA as a whole support this interpretation. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because a decision favoring Navarro could force dealerships across the United States to alter their payment systems for service advisors, of which there are around 100,000. Such an outcome could also expose dealerships to retroactive liability and back-pay in order to settle FLSA claims concerning overtime. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether service advisors at car dealerships are exempt under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) from the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime-pay requirements.

In 2012, a group of five individuals employed as service advisors (collectively “Navarro”) at Encino Motorcars (“Encino”) filed suit against Encino for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by, among other things, failing to pay them overtime wages.

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FCC v. AT&T Inc.

Issues

Whether a corporation, like an individual, has “personal privacy” that could be violated by disclosure of facts obtained during a law enforcement investigation.

 

The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) generally allows access to, and disclosure of, federal information and records to those who requested them, subject to some exceptions, including one for a disclosure that would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy.” Following a recent investigation of Respondent AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) by Petitioner the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), Respondent CompTel, a non-profit trade association, requested under FOIA all of the records and information pertaining to the FCC’s investigation. In allowing disclosure of some of the information, the FCC rejected AT&T’s argument that such disclosure would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy,” holding that this exception was strictly limited to individuals. AT&T appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that a corporation may have “personal privacy” interests and remanded to the FCC. AT&T argues that the term “personal privacy” applies to corporations as well as individuals, and the FCC argues that such a term is limited to individuals. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the amount of protection given to corporations under FOIA and will likely affect the amount of access the public has to certain private corporate information.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), exempts from mandatory disclosure records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes when such disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of "personal privacy." The question presented is: Whether Exemption 7(C)'s protection for "personal privacy" protects the "privacy" of corporate entities.

Under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, federal agencies must disclose records to anyone who requests them, subject to certain exemptions. See AT&T v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 492 (3d Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

· Time, Adam Cohen: Why Companies Don’t Deserve Personal Privacy Rights (Dec. 15, 2010)

· Inside Counsel, Melissa Maleske: Supreme Court Will Decide if "Personal Privacy" under FOIA Applies to Corporations (Nov. 30, 2010)

· United States Department Of Justice: FOIA Request Handbook

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Gonzales v. Oregon (formerly Oregon v. Ashcroft)

Issues

Whether the Controlled Substance Act authorizes the Attorney General to decide that physician-assisted suicide does not serve a "legitimate medical purpose," thereby nullifying an Oregon statute permitting this particular practice in some circumstances.

 

Congress enacted the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") in 1970 as part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate and control certain drugs and other substances. A 1984 Amendment to the Act authorized the Attorney General to prohibit medical practitioners' use of a controlled substance if that use was "inconsistent with the public interest." 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4). In 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft determined that Oregon physicians' use of a federally registered controlled substance to facilitate physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose, despite an Oregon statute which authorized such use. In Oregon's suit, brought to enjoin Ashcroft from giving any legal effect to his directive, the District Court ruled for Oregon and issued a permanent injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Oregon argues that since states traditionally regulate medical practices, Gonzales (the new Attorney General, replacing Ashcroft) must show that Congress expressly intended to authorize the Attorney General to make such a determination. Gonzales argues that the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of a federal regulation is entitled to deference, even without a clear statement of legislative intent, and that Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA is reasonable. In the alternative, Gonzales argues that Ashcroft's interpretation is consistent with Congress's intent in passing the CSA and the 1984 Amendment. This case will decide the fate the Oregon statute by either expanding or limiting the federal government's authority over traditionally state-regulated medical practices. This case also has far-reaching moral and ethical implications that go beyond the scope of states' rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Attorney General has permissibly construed the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and its implementing regulations to prohibit the distribution of federally controlled substances for the purpose of facilitating an individual's suicide, regardless of state law purporting to authorize such distribution.

In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") as part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate and control certain drugs and other substances. Under the CSA, physicians who prescribe controlled substances are considered "practitioners" who "dispense" controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) and (21). In order to obtain authorization to dispense such controlled substances, practitioners must register with the Attorney General and obtain a Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") certificate of registration.

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Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore

Issues

  1. Do loan guarantors have the same rights and protections that their applicant spouses are given by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?
  2. Does the Federal Reserve Board have the authority to define guarantors as applicants for purposes of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?

 

The Supreme Court will consider whether protections for applicants in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) also extend to spouses who sign guaranties, and whether the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”), in promulgating Regulation B, permissibly expanded the definition of “applicant” in the ECOA to include such guarantors. See Brief for Petitioners, Hawkins & Patterson at i, 8; Brief for Respondent, Community Bank of Raymore at i. The loan guarantors in this case (Hawkins and Patterson) maintain that ECOA’s protections for applicants extend to guarantors, because the ECOA does not explicitly exclude them, and Regulation B clarifies that the ECOA definition of applicants includes guarantors. See Brief for Petitioners at 16, 56. Accordingly, Hawkins and Patterson assert that they have standing to sue to invalidate the loan agreement as illegal and unenforceable under ECOA.  See id. at 51. Raymore, the creditor here, counters that the plain language of the ECOA protects only applicants, not guarantors. See Brief for Respondent at 17–21. Raymore contends that any attempt by the Fed, through Regulation B, to expand the definition of “applicant” in the ECOA to include guarantors was impermissible. See id. at 46. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  could affect the cost of borrowing and change the underwriting standards and costs for loans to married business owners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether “primarily and unconditionally liable” spousal guarantors are unambiguously excluded from being Equal Credit Opportunity Act applicants because they are not integrally part of “any aspect of a credit transaction”; and
  2. Whether the Federal Reserve Board has authority under the ECOA to include by regulation spousal guarantors as “applicants” to further the purposes of eliminating discrimination against married women.

This case begins with a loan dispute between Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson, as guarantors, and the Community Bank of Raymore, (“Raymore”), as creditor. See Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir.

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Holder v. Gutierrez (10-1542) & Holder v. Sawyers

Issues

Should a parent's years of residence after lawful admission be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor for purposes of satisfying the residency requirements of U.S.C. 1229b(a)?

 

In Holder v. Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers, the Supreme Court will determine whether aliens may impute their parents’ time spent lawfully residing in the United States to satisfy residency requirements for cancellation of removal under Section 1229b. In both cases, the individuals entered the United States as children, lived with their legal permanent resident parents, and later became inadmissible due to violations of the law. Attorney General Eric Holder argues that the plain language of 1229b does not allow  imputation,  and that allowing imputation would be contrary to congressional intent. On the other hand, Respondents Gutierrez and Sawyers contend that Congress intended the Immigration and Nationality Act to preserve family unity. They argue that interpreting the statute to disallow imputation would be unreasonable and contrary to congressional intent. If the Supreme Court upholds the imputation rule, aliens who resided with their legal permanent resident parents as minors would be able to impute  the their  parents’ residency period to satisfy the requirements for cancellation of removal under 1229(b).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Questions Presented for 10-1542 [Holder v. Gutierrez]

1. Whether a parent's years of lawful permanent resident status can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years."

2. Whether a parent's years of residence after lawful admission to the United States can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status." 

Questions Presented for 10-1543 [Holder v. Sawyers]

Whether a parent's years of residence after lawful admission to the United States can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status."

​

 

Factual Background for Holder v. Gutierrez

In 1989, respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered the United States to reside with his parents at the age of five. See Brief for Petitioner, Eric H. Holder, Jr.

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Horne v. Flores; Speaker of the Arizona House v. Flores (consolidated)

Issues

1.   Whether increasing general funding for English Language Learner Programs in Arizona by millions of dollars, hiring more qualified teachers, decreasing class size, and creating new programs satisfies the "substantial change of fact" requirement necessary to be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(5) even when the court feels that the funding is still inadequate.

2.     Whether the subsequently passed No Child Left Behind Statute should be used to help define the ambiguous "appropriate action" standard of the Equal Education Opportunities Act, or whether the two statutes serve different purposes and therefore should not be treated as informing one another.

 

Since 1992, Miriam Flores has been claiming that Arizona does not provide equal education opportunities to students who do not speak English as their first language, in violation of the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974 ("EEOA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. In 2000, a federal district court, finding that Arizona's English Language Learners ("ELL") programs were underfunded, agreed with Flores and ordered Arizona to provide adequate funds to their ELL programs. Arizona did not comply with the order to the court's satisfaction, but did improve their ELL programs through other, managerial type mechanisms. The Arizona House Speaker and Senate President sought Rule 60(b) relief from the court order, claiming that the improvements to the schools constituted "appropriate action" as required by the EEOA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied them relief and now the Supreme Court will have to decide (1) whether Arizona's improvements to its ELL programs, although not achieved through court-ordered sufficient funding increases, constituted "appropriate action" and thus were sufficient for Rule 60(b) relief from the court order, and (2) in determining this question, whether the court should define "appropriate action" using the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001's specific standards for the implementation of adequate English Language Learner programs.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Questions Presented in 08-289

1. By interpreting the phrase "appropriate action" under Section 1703(f) of the Equal Education Opportunity Act as a requirement that the State of Arizona provide for a minimum amount of funding specifically allocated for English Language Learner programs statewide, did the Ninth Circuit violate the doctrine prohibiting federal courts from usurping the discretionary power of state governments to determine how to appropriately manage and fund their public education systems?

2. Should the phrase "appropriate action" as used in Section 1703(f) of the Equal Education Opportunity Act be interpreted consistently with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, where both Acts have the same purpose with respect to English Language Learners and the NCLB provides specific standards for the implementation of adequate English Language Learner programs, but the EEOA does not?

Questions Presented in 08-294

1. Whether a federal-court injunction seeking to compel institutional reform should be modified in the public interest when the original judgment could not have been issued on the state of facts and law that now exist, even if the named defendants support the injunction.

2. Whether compliance with NCLB's extensive requirements for English language instruction is sufficient to satisfy the EEOA's mandate that States take "appropriate action" to overcome language barriers impeding students' access to equal educational opportunities.

In the small Mexican border city of Nogales, Arizona, the vast majority of primary through high school students are Hispanic, and Spanish is their primary language. See Flores v. Horne, 516 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Feb.

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